Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
All Sprouts Content

7-9-2010

A Risk Assessment Framework for InterOrganizational Knowledge Sharing
Ruba Aljafari
University of Nebraska at Omaha, raljafari@unomaha.edu

Surendra Sarnikar
Dakota State University, sarnikar@acm.org

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/sprouts_all
Recommended Citation
Aljafari, Ruba and Sarnikar, Surendra, " A Risk Assessment Framework for Inter-Organizational Knowledge Sharing" (2010). All
Sprouts Content. 350.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/sprouts_all/350

This material is brought to you by the Sprouts at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in All Sprouts Content by an
authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

Sprouts

Working Papers on Information Systems

ISSN 1535-6078

A Risk Assessment Framework for Inter-Organizational
Knowledge Sharing
Ruba Aljafari
University of Nebraska at Omaha, USA
Surendra Sarnikar
Dakota State University, USA

Abstract
Internet-based Information, Communication and Collaboration technologies are making it
easier for organizations and knowledge workers to collaborate across organizational
boundaries. However, it is necessary for organizations to monitor, regulate and build
appropriate security mechanisms in collaboration systems to prevent loss of strategic
knowledge and competitive advantage. In this paper, we present a risk assessment framework
that can help organizations identify valuable knowledge assets exposed through collaboration
technologies, and assess the risk of knowledge loss, intellectual property leakage, and the
subsequent loss of competitive advantage so that appropriate security mechanism can be
designed to prevent such a loss. We present an illustrative scenario to demonstrate the
feasibility of the framework, and describe a prototype decision support system for automating
the risk assessment process.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Organizations are increasingly using collaboration technologies and systems to move
towards collaborative inter-organizational network structures. Such network structures are being
used to manage various business processes such as supply chain processes, joint product
development, customer relationship management, development of industry standards, and for
engaging in collaborative commerce. In addition to formalized inter-organizational collaboration
mechanisms, organizations and their knowledge workers are also leveraging the powerful
capabilities of Web 2.0 technologies such as Wiki’s, blogs, discussion forums, social networks
and online communities in serving their business needs. Examples of use include interaction with
customers in order to generate ideas and feedback as in cases like GM, Domino’s Pizza, and
Dove [10] or to encourage employees to communicate ideas and experiences as in cases like
Microsoft and Apple [32].
While knowledge workers continue to leverage such technologies to engage in ad hoc
collaboration with customers, vendors, and professional colleagues to exchange knowledge and
provide improved services, it is also necessary to ensure that they do not expose strategic
organizational knowledge to threats [16]. Web 2.0 technologies are inherently difficult to secure,
as they make organizational intelligence more accessible and searchable [40]. Several news
reports and companies have reported cases of intellectual property leakage and loss due to
insufficient protection of knowledge assets [6, 21, 24, 47]. Even as companies restrict the use of
technologies by using tools such as e-mail monitoring or non-disclosure policies, data and IP
leakage is still considered a major risk that is even ahead of viruses and Trojans [32, 35, 41].
Benefits and risks associated with inter-organizational collaboration and knowledge
sharing have been discussed in the literature from a very high level and strategic perspective.
Significant work has also been done in the area of information security risk assessment and
security mechanisms for inter-organizational collaboration systems. While there are several IT
risk assessment models such as the Control Objectives for Information and related Technology
COBIT [26], the Information Technology Infrastructure Library ITIL [9] and the series of
information security standards ISO/IEC 27000 [42], their scope is limited to technology
infrastructure and data and information assets and does not consider knowledge assets. In their
study of identifying risks in e-commerce relationships, Sutton, Hampton, Khazanchi and Arnold
[45] point that IT governance frameworks do not provide guidelines for assessing interorganizational risks, as they seem to focus solely on technical issues. Moreover, most
information assurance frameworks focus on data assets rather than knowledge. On the other
hand, while there are several knowledge management frameworks that help identify and analyze
knowledge assets, such frameworks are rarely integrated into existing risk assessment
frameworks. There is limited literature that provides a structured process for identifying strategic
knowledge assets exposed through collaboration systems, specific risks associated with sharing
those assets in inter-organizational collaboration, and strategies for selecting techniques to
minimize the knowledge sharing risk in inter-organizational collaboration.
In this paper, we build on past research in knowledge sharing and Information Systems
risk assessment to propose a framework for identifying strategic knowledge assets and potential
threats to the knowledge assets exposed by collaboration technologies. In this framework, we
take an integrated approach to address the complexity of business networks or the extended
enterprise [15]. We extend the Freeze and Kulkarni [19] characterization of knowledge assets to
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define knowledge assets as tangible and “intangible assets that encompass the knowledge as well
as the ability of an organization to leverage that knowledge. They can also be the technology that
facilitates the interaction of the knowledge with the human capital”. The term risk is used in this
study to refer to the potential damage, loss, or negative effect of sharing those knowledge assets.
Bayer and Maier [2] further elaborate on these negative effects by stating that “knowledge risk
can be caused by the loss of, unsuccessful intended or unintended transfer of knowledge assets
that result in loss or non-exclusivity of these assets”.
The proposed framework includes a systematic process through which organizations can
identify, value knowledge assets and estimate potential strategic risks by sharing those assets.
The framework consists of five essential components that focus on (1) identifying knowledge
sharing practices, (2) identifying knowledge assets, (3) identifying collaboration technologies
that expose these knowledge assets, (4) identifying the risk associated with the knowledge assets,
and (5) a Dempster-Shaefer based model for quantifying the risks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background and context
on inter-organizational collaboration. Section 3 reviews relevant literature in inter-organizational
collaboration and knowledge sharing and information technology risk assessment. Based on the
findings from the literature review, we generate the requirements of the proposed framework in
Section 4, and provide a detailed description of the proposed framework in terms of the required
steps and the objective, method and output of each step. Section 5 presents the design of a
decision support system based on the framework followed by an illustrative case that
demonstrates the use and feasibility of this framework in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes
the paper with a summary of contributions and opportunities for future research.
2. BACKGROUND
Previous research has suggested that firms are better off when they use and re-use mature
internal as well as external ideas in different domains, because this is more cost effective than
creating the same ideas from scratch [23]. Organizations are therefore increasingly exploring
inter-organizational knowledge sharing arrangements within an environment that allows them to
build valuable intellectual capital and knowledge assets [22].
In Figure 1, we present a typical knowledge sharing scenario in inter-organization
networks in the context of the value chain of a computer manufacturing organization, where
inbound, manufacturing, and outbound logistics bring together suppliers, manufacturers,
customers, retailers and other partners. The labeled arrows between different entities show the
flow of different types of knowledge that may take place between the entities.
As can be noted from the figure, knowledge sharing can appear at any stage or subprocess within the value chain of a company. For example, component design knowledge can be
transferred between a Semi-conductor chips manufacturer and the computer manufacturer. Best
practices and benchmarking knowledge can be transferred between different computer
manufacturers. Customer support agents may share product design knowledge with customers
and receive customer requirements knowledge. While several knowledge sharing activities may
have beneficial impacts on the company, harmful knowledge sharing activities are also possible.
Inadvertent disclosure of sensitive business knowledge or information could be an example of
such activities [27]. Computer engineers and knowledge workers at the computer manufacturer,
for instance, may share product design knowledge inadvertently with competitors through
communities of practice or ad hoc collaborations. Such harmful transfer of knowledge may also
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occur through regular customer support interactions, or interactions with suppliers and vendors
resulting in a strategic risk to the computer manufacturer.

Figure 1 Knowledge sharing in the computer industry

Collaboration among organizations can take the form of strategic alliances, where
knowledge sharing and acquisition are critical for creating customer value and improving
competitive advantage [29]. However, knowledge sharing may be problematic in such systems
since it involves diverse relationships and participants in this system may have conflicting
interests. For example, risks pertaining to knowledge sharing may arise when knowledge is
transferred to other projects that may benefit competitors of the firm that owns the original
product or when the partner decides to move to innovating the basic product [1].Thus, a more
systematic approach is required to help organizations in identifying and assessing risks and
therefore be able to design the most effective security measures. Such a framework will enable
organizations to take a more proactive approach in a given knowledge sharing scenario.
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
We classify relevant literature into two main categories that include inter-organizational
collaboration and information technology risk assessment.
3.1 Inter-organizational Collaboration and Knowledge Sharing
Inter-organizational knowledge sharing has been analyzed from three different
perspectives, technical, behavioral and strategic. The technical perspective is mostly focused on
designing and implementing secure systems and architectures for collaborative knowledge
sharing. The behavioral perspective includes research that explores behavioral issues related to
collaborative knowledge sharing, such as trust and social ties among participants in the same
collaboration system. Finally, the strategic perspective analyzes inter-organizational knowledge
sharing benefits and risks from a high level. We further explore the strategic perspective as it
provides key insights necessary for the identification and assessment of knowledge sharing risks.
The importance of the strategic perspective is risk management illustrated by Schaak, Dynes,
Kolbe, and Schierholz [38] who develop an IS risk oriented outsourcing model based on the
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notion that the vocal point of risk management should be the business mission rather than
focusing directly on IT security issues. The model integrates best practices in IS risk
management and abstractions of the outsourcing process in order to identify and manage IS risks
with outsourcing partners. In order to analyze the strategic impact of knowledge sharing, Levy,
Leobbecke, and Powell [28] proposed a game theoretic approach to analyze inter-organizational
knowledge sharing among small and medium enterprises (SME). In an empirical investigation of
their model, they find that SME’s are good at knowledge creation but are poor at knowledge
retention and need to recognize the value of knowledge shared to retain competitive advantage.
Most firms depend on legal contracts and policies to control knowledge sharing. However,
developing such policies to ensure high level of control and flexibility at the same time is a
difficult problem [5]. Moreover, organizations may acquire and use knowledge that is beyond the
boundaries of the legal agreement governing specific knowledge assets. For example, partners in
a strategic alliances can learn from each other business and management skills that they were
lacking individually [30].
According to Das and Teng [11] there can be two types of risks in strategic alliances, that
include relational risk and the performance risk. Performance risk is basically related to the
probability that alliance objectives may not be met despite good relations between partners [11].
Such risks may arise because of new entrants to the industry, demand fluctuations, changing
government policies, and lack of competence of partner firms. In the context of supply chain
management, Dynes, Brechbühl, and Johnson [14] analyze information security in the extended
enterprise by focusing on two types of risks. Those include, risks pertaining to internal IT
systems and information as a result of integrating the supply chain and risks to a firm’s ability to
produce products as a result of supply chain disruptions caused by information infrastructure
events. The relational risk arises because of the fact that partners may have their own individual
interests that may conflict with those of other partners. This may result in opportunistic behavior,
as described by [11,12], such as cheating, distorting information or knowledge and appropriating
shared resources. In the supply chain, for instance, access to valuable logistics information can
be used to seize control of cargo [46]. Even in cases where legal agreements exist, partner
organizations may acquire and use knowledge not covered by legal agreements for competing
purposes. Other knowledge sharing risks may include diffusion of the firm’s knowledge [4], as
the value of the shared knowledge diminishes, which results in a potential loss of competitive
advantage [34]. In strategic alliances, predicting and managing conflicts, which may be
important sources of risk, is usually overlooked [33]. While there are many benefits to
knowledge sharing, organizations need to weigh the benefits against risks pertaining to
knowledge sharing. A summary of the risks related to knowledge sharing is illustrated in Table
1.
Table 1 Risk factors
Risk factor
Unauthorized learning
Unauthorized sharing of sensitive knowledge
Unauthorized use of knowledge asset
Manipulation of knowledge asset
Appropriation of knowledge asset
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3.2 Information Technology Risk assessment
In addition to literature on strategic risk in alliances and collaborations, another related
area of literature includes the Information Technology risk assessment techniques. The main
focus of Information Technology risk assessment literature is the securing of IT assets from
external and internal threats. There are several IT risk assessment models proposed in literature
[8, 9, 26, 36, 42, 43, 44] A typical IT risk assessment process begins with identifying data,
information and technology assets that might be exposed to risk and quantifying threats
associated with them [36]. This process can be challenging since evaluation in this domain can
be highly subjective [17], as managers assign personal judgments on related risks. After
identifying those vulnerable assets and determining risk, experts can design, select, apply the
best protection mechanisms and evaluate them in an iterative manner [17, 18]. Examples of IT
Risk Assessment models include the Policy Framework for Interpreting Risk in E-business
Security (PFIRES) [36], the Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems by
[43], OCTAVE [8], and COBIT [26].
Although there are risk assessment frameworks for information technology assets, and
literature on collaboration risk and strategic issues in inter-organizational knowledge sharing,
currently there is no structured process that can help organizations analyze risks in interorganizational knowledge sharing and Web 2.0 collaboration and sharing environments.
Organization’s knowledge assets, which may be tacit or explicit, are vulnerable to threats when
exposed to external organizations through collaborative settings. Thus, organizations need to
analyze different aspects related to knowledge sharing in these settings. For instance, is there a
risk that partners can gain access to knowledge that the sharing firm uses in other business areas?
What kind of knowledge is being diffused through employee blogs or employee participation in
technical discussion forums? Is the knowledge diffused strategic to the company? What are the
most appropriate protection mechanisms in such situations? Currently there exists no framework
that can help managers address these aspects. In the next section, we build on past literature in
Information Technology risk assessment to develop a framework that can help in assessing risks
of knowledge sharing.
4. RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
A firm must go through a systematic methodology to assess inter-organizational
knowledge sharing risk. In this paper, we extend previous risk assessment methodologies such as
the NIST Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems [43] and the PFIRES by
[36] to develop a risk assessment framework that is suited for the inter-organizational knowledge
sharing case. Since knowledge is often shared using information and communication
technologies, we begin by building upon Information Technology risk assessment frameworks
and extend them to incorporate knowledge assets and risks associated with knowledge sharing.
In the next section, we present the requirements of the framework followed by a detailed
description of the risk assessment process.
4.1 Requirements
The main objective of the framework is to provide a structured process for managers to
identify and evaluate risks pertaining to knowledge sharing. We have identified three key factors
from strategic knowledge sharing and risk management literature that influence the utility and
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success of the proposed framework. The factors include identifying and recognizing the content
that is shared, the context in which knowledge is shared, and the inherent subjectivity in valuing
knowledge assets and assessing risks.
A key element of the risk assessment process is the systematic identification of the assets
that need to be protected [18, 26, 36, 46]. As organizations increasingly engage in interorganizational collaborative projects, it is important that they recognize the knowledge assets
that are involved in the collaborative processes, their characteristics, and the strategic advantage
provided by the knowledge asset to the organization [5, 7]. Identification of knowledge assets as
well as their strategic value is essential to retain strategic advantage as organizations balance
benefits and risks of knowledge sharing in co-operation and competition situations [28].
In addition to identification of knowledge assets, the context in which the knowledge
assets are shared has important implications for assessing knowledge sharing risks [5]. The
knowledge sharing context includes the business processes in which knowledge is being shared,
the entities involved, and the associated collaboration and communication technologies.
Communication and Collaboration technologies are important conduits for knowledge transfer
and different technology features can act as filters or enablers of knowledge transfer.
Mentzas and Apostolou [31] for instance, emphasized the need for understanding the role
of electronic media in analyzing inter-organizational knowledge transfer. Bayer and Maier [2]
consider the role of collaborative use of information systems in knowledge transfer. In their
study of information sharing in supply chain management systems, [46] identify information
technology solutions as important elements in ensuring the security of information sharing. Thus,
identifying collaboration technologies through which potential knowledge transfer takes place is
an important requirement of the risk assessment process.
The subjectivity in experts’ judgments in estimating risks also needs to be reduced by
deploying sufficient analytical capabilities. Since risk assessment involves judgment and
decision making at some point in the process, a common problem associated with such situations
is the subjective nature of those judgments. Subjective judgments could negatively affect the
quality and the reliability of the risk assessment process as a whole [20, 44]. Thus, there is a need
for controlling this problem in order to generate “bias-free” risk estimates.
4.2 Risk Assessment Process
In this section, we describe tasks in the risk assessment process in terms of the objective,
method, and output. An overview of the proposed risk assessment framework is presented in
Figure 2.

Figure 2 Risk assessment process
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4.2.1 Identify inter-organizational processes
Objective:
The objective of this step is to identify organizational processes that may involve sharing
of knowledge assets with external entities. This step is based on the notion that boundaries of the
IT system must be defined in the early stages of the assessment process [43]. An organization
can identify the extent of knowledge sharing activities by identifying the business process that
provide the context through which knowledge assets are shared. This step follows a top down
approach that assists managers by starting with the main process and then narrows down the
focus towards assets involved and their associated risks.
Method:
• Identify key business processes executed by organizational units using the value chain
model, for instance, or any business model that clearly represents the firm’s business
processes and its relationships with suppliers, customers, and competitors.
• Identify organization’s members and external partners involved in those business
processes.
Output:
The final output of this step would be a list of business processes and associated internal
as well as external entities.
4.2.2 Value knowledge assets
Objective:
The main objective of this step is to identify the most valuable knowledge assets that
need to be protected. Organizational knowledge assets may reside in people, documents, or
technology artifacts. In this step, managers begin by identifying and classifying knowledge
assets. This is important because being specific about knowledge assets can help in identifying
related threats and later in identifying securing policies.
Method:
• One approach that can be used to identify knowledge assets is to sketch a tree diagram
with different types and repositories of knowledge resources, so that managers can
clearly spot and identify knowledge assets [3]. Knowledge can be stored in individual’s
or expert’s mind as tacit knowledge or in groups as collective and synergistic [3]. It can
also be encapsulated in artifacts such as practices (e.g. procedures and rules),
technologies and knowledge repositories. Figure 3 illustrates this approach.
• Identify strategic knowledge assets by assessing the (a) value, (b) rareness and (c)
imitability of each knowledge asset. This approach is based on the resource-based view
of knowledge and designed to measure the competitive advantage provided by the
knowledge asset [7]. The value of a knowledge asset is a measure of the extent to which
the asset enables the firm to sense and respond to opportunities and threats in the business
environment. The rareness of the knowledge asset measures the extent to which
competing firms may possess similar knowledge and imitability refers to the difficulty of
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obtaining or imitating the knowledge resource by other organizations that do not own it.
In this framework, a manager could value knowledge assets using these criteria on a scale
from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating the highest value and 1 indicating the least value.

Figure 3 Reservoirs of knowledge (Adapted from Becerra-Fernandez et al. [3])

Output:
The output of this step would be a ranked list of knowledge assets based on the
previously discussed criteria. These assets will be used later on in the risk assessment process as
the unit of focus.
4.2.3 Identify collaboration technologies
Objective:
The objective of this task is to identify the medium or collaboration technology through
which knowledge could be transferred to an external entity. Examples of such technologies
include, but are not limited to, e-mail, Wiki’s, blogs, and discussion boards.
Method:
The method used to accomplish this task involves identification of collaboration
technologies used to share a knowledge asset in the context of the previously identified
processes, internal as well as external entities and strategic assets.
• The technology is identified in the context of a process. For example, the requirements
collection template might be shared with customers via a consultant/customer portal,
whereas, it is shared with vendors and affiliated developers via a project management
website/code versioning system during the development process.
Output:
The output of this step is a Process-Technology-Asset matrix that can help document the
knowledge asset vulnerabilities. Questions evaluating risks will be generated later on based on
elements in this matrix.
4.2.4 Map risks to knowledge assets
Objective:
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The objective of this step is to identify potential threats to strategic knowledge assets in a
given context. In this step, the manager identifies which of the risks factors previously identified
in Section 3.2 apply to the knowledge assets used in a particular business process.
Method:
• List potential threats to the given knowledge assets. Threats arising due to knowledge
sharing include unauthorized learning, unauthorized sharing, unauthorized use,
manipulation, and appropriation of knowledge asset.
Output:
The output of this step is a list of applicable threats to a given combination of processes,
strategic knowledge assets, and collaboration technologies.
4.2.5 Make assertions
Objective:
The main objective of this process is to make assertions on the risks pertaining to sharing
knowledge assets in the context that was generated by the previous steps. In order to accomplish
this objective, the following method is proposed.
Method:
• For each knowledge asset, make assertions, as per the evidential reasoning model of
Dempster-Shafer theory [13, 39], on the vulnerability of knowledge asset to the identified
threats through the given technology. For example, best practices are not vulnerable to
unauthorized sharing through employee blogs. The following step then estimates the
extent to which this assertion holds true given the evidence.
Output:
The final output of this step is a list of assertions for each knowledge asset that relates the
knowledge asset to different technologies and potential threats.
4.2.6 Provide evidence
Objective:
The main objective of this step is to estimate the extent to which the assertions developed
in the previous step hold true by evaluating the current measures, if any, in place to protect the
knowledge assets from the identified threats. To accomplish this objective, the following method
is proposed.
Method:
• The manager identifies the different mechanisms in place to protect the knowledge assets
from the different threats identified in the previous step and enters subjective judgments
as to the extent to which the mechanisms reduce the risk of specific threats to the
knowledge asset. For example, consider the threat of unauthorized sharing for a best
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•

practices knowledge asset through an extranet portal. In order to evaluate the assertion
that “sharing best practices through extranet is not vulnerable to unauthorized sharing by
the external entity”, the manager may identify the mechanisms in place to protect the
knowledge asset from unauthorized sharing as non disclosure agreements, access control
mechanisms and digital rights management techniques.
Then, the manager or an expert can input his/her own judgment about the effectiveness of
the given techniques in protecting the knowledge asset from unauthorized sharing. Such
judgments are captured on a 0-1 scale and are expressed as a degree of belief in support
of the assertions, in support of the negation of the assertion and a degree of uncertainty.
Delphi methods can be used to help achieve consensus among experts or analysts, and
therefore, avoid the effect of subjective judgment when the values are assigned [44].

Output:
The output of this step is an evidential reasoning model that includes assertions and risk
likelihood estimates from multiple experts combined in one model. This model will group these
estimates in a hierarchical way in order to calculate the overall level of risk in the next step.
4.2.7 Calculate risk
Objective:
The main objective of this step is to calculate the overall level of risk by integrating
estimates provided by experts in the previous step. This objective can be accomplished by
following an analytical method that is based on the Dempster-Shafer theory to calculate risks
[13, 39].
Method:
• The Dempster-Shafer theory is based on the notion of combining separate pieces of
evidence to calculate the probability of an event. It is a generalization of the Bayesian
theory of subjective beliefs and is widely applied in diverse domains including
information systems risk assessment [44]. The overall level of risk is calculated based on
weights assigned for evidences within each assertion. The numbers associated with
evidence and assertions such as the belief supporting the assertion and the belief negating
the assertion can be assigned, as mentioned previously, by experienced managers and
analysts.
Output:
The output of this step would be the overall level of risk for each knowledge asset based
on experts’ estimates provided in the earlier step. Following the risk calculations, a ranking of
knowledge assets based on the level of risk associated with sharing each knowledge assets
through a particular technology is presented. For example, the risk of sharing a particular
knowledge asset via technology X may be higher than sharing the same knowledge asset via
technology Y.
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4.2.8 Develop policy
After the overall level of risk is calculated, the manager/s needs to develop a security
policy in order to mitigate these risks. Mitigation efforts include technology solutions such as
those described in [3], or policy and legal solutions. One way to mitigate risk, for example, is to
focus on evaluating the reputation of potential partners, as explained in [2], to help in
anticipating opportunistic behavior.
5. A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR ASSESSING KNOWLEDGE SHARING
RISKS
In this section, we present the design of a decision support system for knowledge sharing
risks based on proposed the risk assessment framework. The decision support system implements
the proposed risk assessment framework and includes analytical capabilities for ranking strategic
knowledge assets, automatically developing a evidential reasoning model, and calculating risks
based on the Dempster-Shaefer theory [13, 39].

Figure 4 System components

The basic components of the system, as shown in Figure 4, include an implementation of
the risk assessment process, a knowledgebase of knowledge sharing risks for mapping
knowledge assets to potential threats, multi-criteria decision algorithms to rank strategic
knowledge assets and Dempster-Shaefer theory based algorithms for risk estimation. The design
includes an interactive user interface to enable the manager to input information on knowledge
assets and displays the evidential reasoning model as well as summary risk reports and
recommendation. Figure 5 illustrates an activity diagram that highlights the risk assessment
tasks.
12
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Figure 5 Activity flowchart

As can be noted from the logic illustrated in the previous figure, the process starts by
creating a profile for a particular business unit. The profile includes basic information such as the
business unit name, number of companies and employees involved, and key processes. The next
step would be to identify internal as well as external entities involved and the knowledge assets
used in each of the processes followed by identification of technologies used to share those
assets. The list of knowledge assets is then presented to the manager to elicit ratings on the value,
imitability and rareness of the knowledge assets. The ratings are then processed by an AHPbased multi criteria decision algorithm [37] that ranks the knowledge assets based on their
strategic value. Using a pair-wise comparison matrix, the knowledge assets are compared to each
other with respect to the value, imitability and rareness criteria and the overall score for a
knowledge asset is determined by combining its priority scores for each criteria. The knowledge
asset with the highest score is ranked as the most valuable asset.
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Next, the system automatically develops an evidential reasoning model with assertions
based on a knowledgebase of knowledge sharing risks, information on strategic knowledge
assets, and the technologies through which they are shared. The process for generating the
evidential reasoning model is shown in Figure 6. Specifically, it begins with a main assertion
developed for each knowledge asset to represent the extent to which sharing the knowledge asset
is secure. As in [2], the formal representation of the main assertion can be given as
Ai (Sharing) = {(Secure, X), (Not Secure, Y)}
Where Ai (Sharing) denotes the assertion made on a particular Asset i, Secure and Not
Secure denote the evaluation grades, X is the value or extent to which sharing Ai is secure, and Y
is the value or the extent to which sharing Ai is not secure. The main assertion is then further
decomposed into more detailed assertions that capture the risk of sharing the particular
knowledge asset via a particular technology. Next, another level of sub-assertions is developed to
decompose the knowledge sharing risks into the specific threats identified in Table 1. The
manager then identifies mitigating measures currently in place to address the knowledge sharing
risks and estimates the extent to which the mitigating measures address the knowledge sharing
risks. Examples of mitigating measures include signing non-disclosure and non-compete
agreements and using access control mechanisms. For each knowledge asset, a belief function is
generated to assess risk factors by propagating across the model probability estimates on the
extent to which the mitigating measures address the underlying risk factors. Finally, the system
analyzes the information and outputs different reports that rank the assets based on their strategic
value and overall risk to the knowledge asset, risk components and technology sources of the
risk.
1. Identify the set of strategic knowledge assets
2. For each strategic knowledge asset Ai, create a main assertion regarding its overall security
Ai (Sharing) = {(Secure, X), (Not Secure, Y)} where X and Y are unknown variables that
represent the extent to which the knowledge asset is assumed to be secure or not secure.
3. For each main assertion about Ai, create a sub-assertion that identifies the technology
through which the asset is shared and could be a sources of potential risks.
4. For each sub-assertion Ai (Sharing through Technology T), create a new sub-assertion that
maps the parent sub-assertion to knowledge sharing risks identified Table 1.
5. For each sub-assertion of the form Ai (Sharing through Technology T is vulnerable to risk
R), identify mitigating measures and elicit probabilities on the extent to which the
mitigating measures prevent a particular threat, do not prevent a particular threat, and the
level of uncertainty of the effect of the mitigating measure.
6. Propagate the probability estimates for each sub-assertion to the parent sub-assertions
using Dempster-Shaefer rule and calculate the values for X and Y in Step 2.
Figure 6 Process for building evidential reasoning model

6. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE AND EVALUATION
In this section, we present an illustrative example to demonstrate the feasibility and utility
of our proposed framework and then discuss the extent to which our proposed framework
satisfies the requirements discussed previously in Section 4.2.
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6.1 Illustrative example
ABC Software is a mid-sized software development consultancy that develops
customized software applications, extensions, and modules to third party software platforms
based on client requests and market needs. The company, whose customers predominantly
include small and mid-size businesses, specializes in serving the needs of specific industries such
as rental companies, and food services industry, as well as specialty development platforms such
as mobile computing apps and social networking apps. A sample list of products developed by
the company for different vendor platforms is given in Table 2.
Table 2 Sample products of ABC software
Lotus Notes
Joomla CMS
Sync App for Android
Sync App for iPhone
Lotus Notes CRM Database
ACL Security Manager

Event Management Module
Auction Module
ActiveDirectory Extension
Log Analysis Module

As a part of its business process, the company’s engineers and employees participate in
several different online discussion forums, blogs and use other Web 2.0 media to market the
product, answer user questions, understand user needs, gather bug reports, provide technical
support and collaborate with vendors and other developers. The knowledge assets of the firm
includes codified knowledge objects such as software toolkits and best practices as well as
knowledge residing in its experts, development teams, and organizational units. Given that the
firm’s business model is heavily dependent on its knowledge assets, securing those knowledge
assets, whether tacit or explicit, is a key requirement for the firm. In the rest of this section, we
apply our proposed risk assessment framework and present an analysis of the knowledge sharing
risks for the firm with respect to specific knowledge assets in particular collaboration settings. In
order to illustrate key elements of our proposed framework in a concise manner, we focus only
on a small subset of the knowledge assets and a single business process. The process illustrated
here can be iteratively applied by considering multiple business processes and knowledge assets
to perform a comprehensive analysis of the knowledge sharing risks at an organization.
The first step of the risk assessment process includes the identification of key business
processes of the organization that involve the generation of new knowledge, utilization of
organizational knowledge assets, and interaction with external entities. For example, consider the
requirements analysis process in ABC Software’s Rental Services Software Unit. The
requirements gathering process includes the creation of new knowledge on market needs,
application of industry specific best practices and templates for the collection of customer
requirements, and involves interaction with customers and sub-contractors to gather
requirements and analyze product offerings. A description of the process, entities involved and
related knowledge assets is shown in Table 3.
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Process
Requirements analysis

Table 3 Key processes and entities involved
Entities
Knowledge assets
Internal
External
Companies
Customers
Employee1: Software consultant
employees
Subwith expertise in rental industry
contractors
Generic requirements analysis
template
Rental industry requirements
elicitation best practice

The second step of the risk assessment process requires the manager to identify all the
knowledge assets used in this process and to value the knowledge assets in terms of the
competitive advantage derived by the organization through the assets. The knowledge assets are
rated in terms of three criteria that include value, imitability, and uniqueness. Table 4 illustrates a
sample rating of value, uniqueness and imitability for the knowledge assets identified earlier in
the process. For example, while a generic requirements collection process is of significant value
to conducting a business process, it is a widely used process across the industry and easily
available. However, the retail industry specific best practices, and the tacit knowledge of a
software consultant represent significant intellectual capital which is difficult to imitate and not
widely available in the marketplace. Based on the ratings, the knowledge assets can then be
ranked in terms of their strategic value using AHP-based multi-criteria decision algorithm to
identify the most strategic knowledge assets. The project manager can then focus the risk
management efforts on the strategically most important assets as identified by the ranking.
Table 4 Knowledge assets valuation
Knowledge asset
Value
Imitability
Generic requirements collection
3
1
template
Rental industry requirements
4
2
collection template
Software consultant: rental
4
3
industry

Rareness
1
3
3

Following the identification of strategic knowledge assets, the next step would be to
identify collaboration technology through which these assets are shared. The rental industry
specific requirements collection best practices, for instance, which ranked high on value and
rareness, is shared via Wiki’s, Email, client portals and collaborative development environments
with sub contractors. The knowledge assets and a list of collaboration technologies that expose
the knowledge assets are given in Table 5.
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Table 5 Identify collaboration technology
Context
Business process
Technology
Rental industry requirements
Requirements analysis
Best practice Wiki
collection template
Client portal
Collaborative development
environment
Word forms over e-mail
Software consultant with rental
Requirements analysis
Best practice Wiki
industry experience
Corporate employee blogs
Knowledge asset

Once the technology through which strategic knowledge assets are shared is identified,
the next step involves mapping the knowledge assets to potential threats and developing
assertions that can be evaluated using an evidential reasoning model. There are several potential
risks due to knowledge sharing as identified in Section 3.2. For example, a sub-contractor could
engage in unauthorized learning and use of the best practice knowledge asset for developing
competing products, or a client could share the requirements knowledge with a competing third
party for development.
In order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the knowledge sharing risk,
assertions regarding the knowledge assets and the threats are generated by mapping the different
risks to knowledge assets in the context of various information and communication technologies
that are used to share the knowledge assets. For example, a main assertion in this case states that
the rental industry requirements elicitation best practice is not vulnerable to opportunistic
behavior via an Extranet Knowledge Wiki. Sub-assertions would then break down this risk
further to various threats such as manipulation, appropriation and other threats identified earlier.
The assertions are then compiled into an evidential reasoning model as shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7 Mapping risks to knowledge assets, making assertions, and providing evidence

Following the mapping of threats to knowledge assets, the mitigation measures currently
in place to protect the knowledge assets are evaluated to determine the residual risk. In this step
the manager provides evidence, such as risk control mechanisms, to assess the extent to which
knowledge assets are not vulnerable to various risks. For example, a manager may believe that
sharing requirements elicitation best practice via the WIKI is not vulnerable to manipulation due
to access controls mechanisms in place to prevent unauthorized changes. Similarly, the manager
may believe that that non-disclosure agreement as a control mechanism is sufficient to mitigate
unauthorized sharing risk. Examples of more measures to mitigate knowledge sharing risks are
listed in Table 6.
Table 6 Mitigating measures
Measure
Use of Non-disclosure Agreements
Use of Non-compete Agreements
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Access Control Mechanisms
Audit Trails/Traceability Mechanisms

In addition to providing the evidence, the manager also provides subjective estimates on
the extent to which such measures mitigate the threats. For example, the estimates on the extent
to which sharing best practices via a Wiki is not vulnerable to unauthorized sharing due to the
use of non disclosure agreements is recorded as (0.7, 0.1, 0.2). Here 0.7 refers to the manager’s
belief on a 0-1 scale that non disclosure agreements prevent unauthorized sharing of the
knowledge assets., whereas 0.1 refers to the the manager belief that non disclosure agreements
are not effective in preventing unauthorized sharing and 0.2 refers to the degree of uncertainty of
its effect on unauthorized sharing. Based on the estimates provided by the manager, the level of
risk associated with each knowledge asset via a particular technology is calculated and displayed
in a ranked order. In order to concentrate the manager’s efforts on those assets that require the
highest level of attention, the assets would be ranked based on their strategic value as can be
noted from Figure 8. The manager can then determine additional security measures to protect the
most strategic knowledge assets.

Figure 8 Calculating risks and ranking strategic assets
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7. CONCLUSIONS
A critical dilemma that modern firms face in today’s dynamic business environments is
realizing the benefits of collaboration while maintaining competitive advantage, especially when
collaboration involves sharing knowledge assets contributing to the firm's advantage. Incidents
such as Intellectual Property (IP) leakage and failure of strategic alliances call for more research
in this domain. While there is always a margin of error in predicting the success of interorganizational relationships, organizations could benefit by following a more proactive approach
in identifying potential vulnerabilities to strategic knowledge assets that are exposed in
collaborative settings, which can help in the design of more efficient and dynamic securing
policies.
In this paper, we have leveraged work in two relevant areas, knowledge management and
risk assessment, in solving such a dilemma. Specifically, our contributions in this paper include
(1) a risk assessment framework that assists project managers in identifying strategic knowledge
assets that are shared through particular business processes using specific collaboration
technologies. (2) a system design for a decision support system for knowledge sharing risks
based on the proposed framework, and (3) an illustrative scenario that demonstrates the use and
feasibility of our knowledge sharing risk assessment approach.
To the best of our knowledge, our approach is among the first to present a structured
framework for organizations to help identify strategic knowledge assets and their vulnerabilities.
The knowledge sharing risk assessment framework can provide significant benefits to
organizations in identifying and protecting their strategic knowledge assets and competitive
advantage.
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